Silver Democracy Youth Representation in an Aging Japan

In nearly every democracy, the people who will live longest with the consequences of today’s decisions are the very people least likely to be making them. As populations age and the young become an ever smaller proportion of the electorate, the worry is that their concerns will be even less represented and their faith in democratic institutions will continue to erode. Japan offers a window into that future. It is the world’s oldest society and one where the young are especially underrepresented at all levels of government, from local assemblies to the national parliament.

In Silver Democracy, I argue that the problem is not that young candidates are less appealing to voters. To the contrary, many voters, including older voters, like young candidates for their fresh ideas, their focus on the needs of young families, and their personal stake in the long-term challenges of population aging and decline. The problem is institutional. In Japan, as in many democracies, a successful candidacy often depends on money, name recognition, and networks that can take decades to build. These demands favor older people with established careers, keeping younger people off the ballot before voters get a say.

I then show how youth representation has substantial consequences for policy and democracy. Municipalities that elect a young mayor increase spending on child welfare for young families, especially through long-term investments in childcare infrastructure, but do not cut elderly welfare spending. Bringing more young people into municipal assemblies also enhances perceptions of fairness and trust in institutions, even among the elderly. Together, these findings suggest that greater youth representation can encourage investment in the future and strengthen confidence in democratic institutions without pitting young against old.

The book draws on both quantitative and qualitative methods. At the heart is my newly constructed Japanese Municipal Elections Dataset (JMED), which covers the near universe of candidates who ran for municipal assembly or mayor from 2005 to 2025: 223,569 candidates competing in 21,111 elections across 2,027 municipalities. With this new data, I first use quasi-experimental analyses to examine how institutions keep young people off the ballot and how policy changes when young people are elected. I then pair these observational tests with survey experiments that use age regression and progression software to vary politicians’ apparent ages and see how citizens respond, and with evidence from other advanced democracies to show that the results extend beyond Japan.

Finally, I draw on more than 40 interviews in Japanese with mayors, assembly members, and local officials to understand how younger politicians decide to run and what their priorities are once in office.

Related papers

• Too Young to Run? Voter Evaluations of the Age of Candidates (with Yoshikuni Ono)
  2024. Political Behavior 46(4):2333-2355.
  Abstract

  Why do elected officials tend to be much older than most of their constituents? To understand the mechanisms behind the underrepresentation of young people in public office, we conducted two novel survey experiments in Japan. We asked voters in these experiments to evaluate the photos of hypothetical candidates while altering candidates’ faces using age regression and progression software. Contrary to the observed age demographics of politicians, the voters in our experiments strongly disliked older candidates but viewed younger and middle-aged candidates as equally favorable. Voters saw young candidates as less experienced but also more likely to focus on many policy issues over a longer period, including education, childcare, climate change, anti-corruption measures, and multiculturalism. Young voters especially liked young candidates, suggesting that greater youth turnout could increase youth representation. Conversely, elderly candidates were universally panned, seen as the least competent, least likely to focus on most policy issues, and least electable. Voter biases thus do not seem to be a driving factor behind the shortage of young politicians. To the contrary, voters appear perfectly willing to cast their ballots for young candidates.

• Does Youth Representation Matter for Social Spending?
  2026. The Journal of Politics.
  Abstract

  Young people are underrepresented in most political institutions. While studies have investigated the causes behind the shortage of younger politicians, the potential consequences for the substantive representation of young people’s interests in policy outcomes remains under-researched. I argue that younger politicians will be more likely than older politicians to allocate social spending toward child welfare for young families. Using an original dataset of over 12,000 mayoral candidates in Japan (2006–2019) and a regression discontinuity design, supplemented by interviews with 15 mayors, I find that municipalities that elect younger mayors increase spending on child welfare, especially through long-term investments in infrastructure. Mechanism tests and interviews suggest these effects stem from younger mayors’ different life stages and longer time horizons rather than greater electoral incentives to court younger voters. Notably, younger mayors do not cut elderly welfare spending, suggesting youth representation can benefit young families without necessarily exacerbating intergenerational conflict over welfare.

• Youth Representation and Democratic Legitimacy (with Aksel Sundström and Daniel Stockemer)
  Forthcoming. British Journal of Political Science.
  Award 2026 State Politics and Policy Quarterly Best Paper Award, APSA State Politics and Policy Section

  Abstract

  How does the age composition of democratic institutions shape public evaluations of their legitimacy? While most institutions are dominated by older politicians, we argue that incorporating younger representatives can enhance perceptions of legitimacy. To test this claim, we conduct a survey experiment in the United States that varies the age composition of a bipartisan state legislative committee and its decisions. We find that including younger members increases perceptions of procedural fairness and institutional trust, and improves evaluations of decisions on lower-salience policies. These effects are stronger among young people and Democrats. Evidence on mechanisms suggests these legitimacy gains reflect beliefs that younger politicians are more attuned to young people’s experiences and concerns. Observational evidence from U.S. state legislatures and a replication experiment in the United Kingdom yield consistent patterns, suggesting that these findings extend beyond the original experimental context. This suggests that expanding youth representation can meaningfully strengthen democratic legitimacy.

Coverage

I have discussed the book's findings in the Asahi Shimbun, The Economist, NPR (2), and The Wall Street Journal (2).